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Introduction
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and proclamation of Geor-
gian independence, the Georgian Orthodox Church successfully filled in the 
political and social vacuum left behind the old ideology. 
As David Lane notes, the fall of the Soviet Union contributed to 
the formation of a new civic concept in post-Soviet and Eastern European 
countries1. 
Lane also adds that new national identity of post-Soviet countries was 
formed in an interesting environment — in the wake of economic and politi-
cal globalization2. Today, all three Baltic countries and a range of post-Soviet 
states, which experienced economic and political transformation in a short 
period of time, are in the European Union3. 
Since 1991, independent Georgia is undergoing democratization and 
construction of a civil society4. When discussing these processes, it is inter-
esting to touch upon the Georgian Orthodox Church and its role in the con-
temporary Georgian nation state. 
Even in the last years of Communist leadership increased interest in the 
Church was apparent. It needs to be noted that the so called intelligentsia, – 
representatives of educated strata, started to attend the Patriarch’s sermons5. 
Among them were members of scientific circles too. For instance, lab scien-
tists from Abastumani Astrophysical Observatory, who at the time were the 
elite of Georgian scientific society, would often attend and later discuss the 
Patriarch’s sermons6. 
Today, the disposition of Georgian society and specifically of Georgian 
youth, towards religion and the Church is an interesting topic for researchers 
since the issue is comparably understudied. Before the dissolution of the So-
viet Union international academic society was primarily interested in Geor-
gian linguistics, literature and history7. After the declaration of independence, 
when Georgia entered the lines of sovereign states, international scholars 
started to take interest in the region from the perspective of international re-
lations, emphasizing national security and economy8. Nevertheless, more and 
more articles and critical essays are produced on the topic of identity and con-
temporary Georgian nationalism. Systematic studies of Georgian collective 
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identity and scholarly works on these topics, however, are still scarce9. Excep-
tions include the World Values Survey (2008) funded by the Soros Founda-
tion and the Caucasus Barometer, an annual family survey conducted by the 
Caucasus Research Resource Centers (CRRC) program10. 
According to the 2010 study of CRRC, 82% of Georgians identify 
themselves as Orthodox. 51% of the population thinks that religion plays a 
fairly important role in their everyday life, while 41% considers that religion 
plays a very important role in their daily life. The same study suggests that 
47% of respondents between 18 and 35 years old deem religion as fairly im-
portant, and 48% as very important in their daily life11. 
Politics is one of the domains were growing significance of the Church 
in the development of national identity is obvious. “The Role of the Orthodox 
Church in the Development of Georgian Identity”, a collaborative research ini-
tiative between the Caucasus Swiss Network and Ilia State University, includes 
interviews with Georgian politicians. The interviews are aimed at determining 
the attitude of major political parties towards the role of the Church in poli-
tics, rights of religious and ethnic minorities, church-state relationship, status 
of the Church, and so on. Based on the research outcomes it can be argued 
that contemporary Georgia is in a paradoxical situation: on the one hand, since 
the declaration of independence it has been striving to build a European-style 
democratic system, which requires the acknowledgement of diversity and mul-
ticultural principles only feasible through the separation of church and state 
and ‘religiously neutral’ social conditions12. It must be added that the interviews 
conducted in the framework of the research revealed that the majority of main 
political parties supports the establishment of a European-style democratic sys-
tem. Simultaneously, as we will discuss later, a large section of Georgian politi-
cal elite acknowledges the special role of the Orthodox Church in society and 
supports the reinforcement of its status in one form or another; this tendency 
inadvertently contributes to a stronger role of the Church in the public domain. 
Persecuted during the Soviet Union, religion in independent Georgia 
successfully incorporated nationalist ideology in its agenda and became a cat-
alyst in the process of nation-building. In this regard, contemporary Georgia 
differs from today’s Europe where religion is practically absent from public 
domain due to secularization and plays a very modest role in politics. It must 
be noted that the importance of secularization and its role in democracy, 
governance, and global politics, is gradually becoming a subject of dispute13. 
Modernization of a society was believed to contradict religion: if one 
accelerated, the other decelerated14. One of the eminent representatives of 
this theory, Peter Berger, made a bold statement by predicting the demise 
of religion: “we need to presume that by the 21st century religious believers will 
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only remain in small sects, united against the secular culture of the world” 15. This 
prediction was based on the theory of secularization, which was particularly 
popular in the 1950s16. 
The proponents of the ‘disappearing religion’ thesis had serious argu-
ments on their side in the 20th century17. Today, the situation is considerably 
different from what Berger predicted18 — ascendance of religions has a global 
character. Barker suggests that it is important to switch the emphasis from 
the increasing role of religion to the nature of change; he brings in Toft, Phil-
pott, and Shah to support his argument19. The influence of religious actors on 
politics is stronger today than in any other period of contemporary history20.
The shift is acknowledged even by those who used to deny the rising 
role of religion21. In the opinion of Jurgen Habermas, “religious traditions and 
religious societies acquired a new, unexpected political significance” and “the im-
portance of religion for attaining political goals increased on a global scale” 22. As 
Barker notes, Peter Berger offered his opinion on secularization during the 
last years of his life. In Berger’s words, “the main difference … is the abandon-
ment of secularization theory, but … not because of any philosophical or theological 
changes, but because this theory can no longer explain the empirical facts observed 
throughout the world” 23. 
Indeed, modernization theory has numerous critics today, partially due 
to rising religious fundamentalism in the past years24. Some experts argue that 
the role of religion in society and politics changed as a result of modernization, 
but its influence on society is still remarkable25. Moreover, there are scholars 
who believe that modernization contributed to the revival, and not the demise, 
of religion26. In many developing countries with radical religious beliefs mod-
ernization is a painful process, causing disappointment and distrust not only 
towards local governments, but also towards Western values — Western coun-
tries are often perceived as the supporters of local regimes27. 
The foremost goal of the Rose Revolution (2003) government was to 
modernize and democratize the country. Success of this mission is widely dis-
puted today, but it is hard to deny that Georgia made a huge leap after the 
revolution28. This leap includes an attempt to create an efficient governing 
body where employees work for salaries and not for bribes; spread of meri-
tocracy, where individuals are evaluated based on their skills and work and 
not their bloodline; development of civil society, where representatives of dif-
ferent ethnicities and religious are equally accepted; economic liberalism and 
so on29. Simultaneously, Saakashvili’s opponents believe that democratization 
was sacrificed in the process of modernization30. This argument is also con-
troversial, especially since a new government was democratically elected in 
2012. It is hard to evaluate the influence of Saakashvili’s reforms because of 
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the religious radicalization of society. However, as we will discuss later, it is 
obvious that the role of the Church has gradually enhanced. 
Historical Overview
The battle for the independence of the Georgian Church lasted from 
the end of the 19th century to the beginning of 20th century31. Natural de-
velopment of the Georgian Church and society came to a halt in 1811, when 
the Russian Emperor unlawfully abolished the autocephaly of the Church, 
annihilated the Patriarchate and subordinated the Church to the Russian 
Ecclesiastical Synod with the status of exarchy32. Even though the Georgian 
Church revived its autocephaly and Patriarchate in 1917, Russia’s political 
course radically affected its development. After the occupation, the Patri-
arch Ambrosi Khelaia confronted the Communist regime and led a worthy 
fight for the independence of the Church. However, he was defeated by the 
so-called Innovation and Reformation Movement within the Church. The 
movement aspired to collaborate with the Communist regime, and accord-
ingly, tolerated the persecution of deviant religious figures33. 
The Georgian Church deteriorated under the Russian bureaucratic re-
gime. In addition to massive robberies and stealing of valuables, Russian hu-
man resource reforms negatively affected the clergy. As noted in the work of 
a Russian historian Nikoloz Durnov, “The Fate of the Georgian Church”, “the 
position of Russian Exarch in Georgia was part of bureaucracy, and naturally, he 
could not introduce any positive changes that could satisfy spiritual needs of the 
Georgian Church. The free Georgian Church was not used to having its fate decided 
by indifferent individuals, such as Russian Exarchs who were antagonistically dis-
posed towards the Holy Church and Georgian people. For almost 100 years, Geor-
gian Exarchs were not involved in anything outstanding, except bureaucracy and 
clerical matters of the Church…”34 The Russian human resource reforms had a 
negative impact on Georgian clergy – “Georgian students… were not familiar 
with theological terms even after graduating from seminary… since theology was 
taught in Russian. The uneducated seminary graduates could not teach their parish, 
who, owing to Russian Exarchs, were already educated by socialists and revolu-
tionaries. His Holiness Kirion acknowledged on a church committee that he did not 
know some theological terms upon his graduation… Even subjects like catechism 
and holy history of Georgia were not taught in Georgian” 35. Owing to Russian 
politics and years spent in a totalitarian system, the Georgian Church was 
unprepared for the country’s independence when thousands of people turned 
to it for ideological guidance. The Soviet regime changed its policy towards 
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the Georgian Orthodox Church during the last decades — it acknowledged 
its existence, but subordinated it to state control36. Georgian clergy went 
through stages of unrestrained confrontation, political tolerance and collabo-
ration with the Soviet anti-religious politics. This happened during the ideo-
logical monopoly of scientific atheism, a value system equal to religious be-
lief for some scientists37. After the declaration of independence, the Geor-
gian Church did not have any experience in tolerance since it did not prop-
erly transition from a totalitarian to a post-totalitarian system. The Church 
became a leading religious confession, a status that was reinforced in 2002 
through a constitutional agreement between the Church and state38. Starting 
from the 1990’s, certain church representatives have been trying to legitimize 
the special role of the Church by relying on religious-nationalist ideas. They 
emphasize the dangers behind Western moral values (human rights, minor-
ity rights, etc.). In these risky circumstances, the Church emerged as the pro-
tector and sustainer of Georgian independence39. It also needs to be noted 
that 19th century Georgian nationalism developed in a different secular con-
text40. As suggested by Giga Zedania, religious topics are weakly represented 
in 1950-60’s publications, which primarily emphasize Georgian nationalism 
project. In the 19th century, Georgian nationalism ideologists did not stress 
the role of the Georgian Orthodox Church in the formation of a Georgian 
identity. As Ghia Nodia points out, „highlighting Orthodox Christianity did 
not work well in a specific practical sense41. For the 19th nationalism secular 
history played a far more important role than religion, blood connection or 
even common language. It would be impossible to culturally integrate differ-
ent religious groups living on the territory of Georgia, such as the Muslim 
majority in Adjara region42, without secular nationalism. In 1987 the Geor-
gian Orthodox Church canonized Ilia Chavchavadze. This event was pre-
sented as a logical continuation of the 19th century nationalism, which re-
emerged in the last years of the Soviet Union43. Giga Zedania believes that 
canonization of Ilia Chavchavadze marks the emergence of religious nation-
alism in Georgia, which radically differs from the 19th century secular na-
tionalism, where the Georgian Orthodox Church and religion did not play 
a major part 44. 
Political Culture in Post-Soviet Georgia 
Totalitarian system, with its lack of political choice and limited right of 
self-expression, exerted a heavy blow on civil society in Georgia. An impor-
tant sign of political incapacity is weakness of political parties, which partly 
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stems from the lack of political education among Georgian population. As 
a result, the electorate supports not a specific ideology, but a certain leader45. 
Overall, post-Soviet party system stands out with its low sustainabil-
ity and adaptability, which in turn is determined by such structural factors 
as absence of stable political belonging46. Politicians do not maintain their 
loyalty to a given party for a long period of time due to fickle, changing and 
unstable electorate and weak party traditions47. Lack of loyalty is especially 
evident when a weakened party is easily abandoned for a more advantageous 
political establishment. The fragmented nature of post-Soviet political system 
is especially obvious in countries like Georgia where bipolar political system 
is at its early stage of development — a condition typical to Eastern Europe 
years ago48. For example, 20 years ago, a Polish political coalition consisted of 
30 parties and different organizations49. A more refined institutional mindset 
and electoral experience slowly diminished the number of political parties50. 
Ideologies of Georgian political parties are often inconsistent51. Left-
wing politics is often represented by anti-capitalist parties that easily adapt 
to nationalist and religious rhetoric. A good example of this phenomenon is 
the Georgian Laborist Party. The study shows that local political parties of-
ten experience ideological contamination. Instead of following one ideology, 
they adopt ideas that are popular. For instance, the Georgian Laborist Party 
considers itself an active defender of the Orthodox Church and Georgian tra-
ditions. Moreover, representatives of the party believe that Orthodox Christi-
anity should become a state religion and constitutional monarchy should be 
resuscitated52. In these circumstances, it is hard to distinguish between the 
ideology of the Laborist Party and right-wing politicians or the Christian-
Democrats. It is also interesting to compare right-wing political parties with 
their counterparts in the West. One major difference is that Georgian right-
wing parties stress national values and religion over economic challenges (a 
topic of political debate in the West). 
Interviews with political party representatives revealed an interesting 
picture. According to the study, some members of the “Georgian Dream” have 
more in common with the “National Movement” than with other members 
of their own party. The United National Movement, the Free Democrats and 
the Republicans are distinctly liberal in their ideology. All three parties sup-
port a clear separation between church and state, oppose Orthodox Chris-
tianity as a state religion, object to the revival of monarchy, and believe that 
adoption of Western standards is crucial for building brighter future. The 
Christian Democrats and the New Rights advocate a special status for Or-
thodox Christianity, while the Christian Democrats and the National Forum 
actively support the revival of monarchy. With the exception of the United 
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National Party and the Republican Party, Georgian politicians believe that 
the Georgian Patriarchate plays a special role in the regulation of Russian-
Georgian relations. The Patriarch’s contribution to post 2008 War events was 
more than once emphasized – especially, the transfer of Georgian deceased 
soldiers from South Ossetia to Georgia. The National Forum, the Laborist 
Party and the Christian-Democrats emphasize the urgency of ‘moral cen-
sure’, which basically implies refraining from negative observations about 
the Patriarch and the Church. Representatives of the National Forum believe 
that “… there has to be a non-state moral censure on literature. If it was my de-
cision, I would establish censure or even legally persecute those people who say and 
write things about the Patriarch. But unfortunately, we cannot do that” 53. Mem-
bers of the Laborist Party state that there is “turmoil in contemporary Geor-
gia… Yes, there needs to be a censure, but not a censure of thought, but of the ways 
in which those thoughts are expressed” 54. 
Another interesting aspect of the study is the image of an ideal Geor-
gian politician as determined by interviews with them. When asked — “Do 
you think a Georgian politician needs to be Orthodox Christian?”, more than 
half of the respondents answered affirmatively; and the majority responded 
with a “yes” to — “Do you think that a politician needs to be an Orthodox 
believer?”55 The majority of politicians distinguish between “traditional” and 
“new” religious minorities. “Traditional” groups include religious minorities 
that have lived in Georgia for several centuries, such as Muslims, representa-
tives of the Armenian Church, Jews and Catholics. It needs to be noted that 
a similar disposition exists in Russia — there have even been talks about in-
troducing a new legislation that would be less liberal towards ‘non-traditional’ 
religious minorities than the legislation of Yeltsin’s era56.  
The majority of interviewed politicians publicly discuss their own re-
ligious background. In most cases, Georgian politicians are members of the 
Georgian Orthodox Church. It is worth noting that from the recognizable 
political figures many have graduated from seminaries. This tendency might 
have been determined the religious awakening of the 1990’s, when active 
young intellectuals became interested in religion. 
Georgian Orthodox Church and State Policy 
towards Religious Minorities 
When discussing the Orthodox Church policies, it is crucial to touch 
upon the Patriarch’s decision to leave the World Church Council in 199757. 
Until 1997, Georgia was an active member of the Council, and at some point, 
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Ilia II even co-presided the organization58. At the same time, the Georgian 
Orthodox Church participated in the European Church Conference, which 
was also abandoned by the Patriarch in 199759. Today, only a few people re-
member joint prayers and liturgies conducted by the Patriarch and a Catho-
lic cardinal. An ambassador of the Holy Church from 2001 to 2011, Clau-
dio Gugerotti reminisces about the late 1980’s when he was welcomed by 
the Patriarch during his visits and conducted liturgies with him60. Joint ser-
mons were held at the Sioni Cathedral. Claudio Gugerotti and His Holiness 
have held a sermon and a communion together, which was a unique episode 
in the history of Christian Orthodox and Catholic churches61. During that 
period His Holiness would remark that just like Peter and Paul, Catholic 
and Christian Orthodox churches were brothers despite certain obstacles and 
they would gradually become one again62.
Today, the Patriarchate no longer recognizes any partnership with the 
Catholic Church. Petre Mamradze, head of the State Chancellery from 1995 
to 2005 notes: “I brought the topic up once or twice, but I was told in a low 
voice that ‘His Holiness repented’”. 
In the beginning of the 90’s, Claudio Gugerotti brought St. Andreas’ 
relics to Georgia as a gift from Pope John Paul. This was a gesture of great 
significance for a country with an Apostolic Church. This act of benevolence 
on behalf of John Paul symbolized improved relations between the Catholic 
and the Georgian Orthodox Church. Later in 2005 Gugerotti showed his 
regret that he, who conducted liturgies with His Holiness and brought St. 
Andreas’ relics to Georgia, was no longer allowed near the relics63. 
After mass protests of September 22, 2003 and persistent demands 
from the representatives of the Georgian Orthodox Church, Eduard She-
vardnadze refused to sign an agreement with Vatican, officially ascribing his 
decision to a misunderstanding64. Archiepiscopus Jean-Louis Tauran, secre-
tary of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, came to Georgia 
to sign the agreement, but had to leave empty-handed on September 21. It 
is worth noting that the agreement was being developed for a long period 
of time — the idea came into existence in 1999 during the visit of the Pope 
to Georgia. The agreement between the Vatican and Georgia addressed state 
issues. A statement from the Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia Ilia II pre-
ceded the mass protests: “an inter-state agreement between Orthodox Georgia 
and the Vatican is unwelcome” 65. The protests were fostered by several high-
ranking clergy. Bishop Zenon publicly thanked participants of the demon-
stration and emphasized that they elevated Georgian soul. He added that 
“despite freedom of religion in Georgia, the constitution prioritizes the Georgian 
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Orthodox Church, and this preference is reinforced via an agreement between the 
state and the Church” 66. 
The refusal to sign the agreement was fairly predictable because of the 
upcoming parliamentary elections. The government in power would not take 
any steps to cause indignance among the population. Mamradze remembers 
Shevardnadze’s words regarding the incident: “it is obvious that the agreement 
will no longer be signed. Now, we need to understand that our state no longer ex-
ists. Now everything can be expected” 67. Indeed, the Rose Revolution started 
only in a few months, in November, 2003.
Constitutional agreement between the Georgian government and the 
Orthodox Church was reinforced in 2002, granting ‘a special status’ to the lat-
ter. The document is often mistakenly referred to as the Concordat — name 
of a treaty between the Vatican and Mussolini’s Italy marking the former’s 
independence68. It needs to be mentioned that the Constitution of Georgia 
states that the Church is independent from the state and that every religion is 
equal despite the special role of the Orthodox Church in Georgian history69. 
During the decision-making a small section of Georgian society expressed 
its negative stance towards the resolution. These people argued that constitu-
tional change would establish the Church’s monopoly, which would be det-
rimental for the Church in the first place. Almost 200 parliament members 
attended the ballot — an unprecedented turnout for the time. The constitu-
tional agreement was approved by 199 votes; only one member, Mikheil Na-
neishvili, refrained70. 
The constitutional agreement determines the status of the Georgian 
Orthodox Church in legal and judicial matters, as well as its relationship with 
the state and other social institutions71. The special status of the Georgian 
Orthodox Church and simultaneous freedom of religious faith and practice 
are listed as the major merits of the constitutional agreement. Archpriest Ro-
stom Lortkipanize believes that the agreement does not grant any privileges 
to the Church. Accordingly, the Church does not receive any special rights 
from the treaty. The archpriest suggests that when a concordat is signed be-
tween two parties, interests of both sides need to be clearly outlined, which 
did not happen in case of the constitutional agreement. “The Concordat needs 
to define not only how prayers and liturgies are conducted, but also the Patriarch-
ate’s duties as a social institution and a national centre, which would subordinate 
all religions to the Mother Church… The Concordat, however, does not grant any 
privileges to Orthodox Christianity… It only affirms that the Georgian state ac-
knowledges the merits of the Georgian Church. It does not grant any tangible rights 
to the Church”72. Archpriest Rostom Lortkipanize believes that it is important 
that the legislation proclaims the Georgian Orthodox Church as the Moth-
147
Struggle for Power: Religion and Politics in Georgia from the 90s to the Present
er Church73. Until 2011 the status of religious minorities was determined by 
2006 legislation, according to which religious groups, excluding the Geor-
gian Orthodox Church, could register as non-commercial organizations (as 
unions or funds) in order to receive full legal status and tax benefits. Dur-
ing the July 12, 2011 Parliamentary Assembly, which discussed changes in 
the civic code pertaining to the status of religious organizations, chairman 
of the Georgian parliament Davit Bakradze noted that Georgia is a tolerant 
country with the Georgian Orthodox Church holding a special status74. In 
his words, granting the status of a legal entity of public law to religious mi-
norities does not restrict the special standing of the Orthodox Church since 
many legal entities in Georgia are considered as legal entities of public law, 
but only the Georgian Orthodox Church enjoys a constitutional status75. De-
spite this, amendment of the civic law on religious minorities triggered mass 
protests. Unlike Shevardnadze’s era, when state refused to sign a treaty with 
the Vatican in order to please the public, the amendment regarding religious 
minorities was approved in conjunction with street protests. 
Another wave of protests against the new law in 2011 once again dem-
onstrated that public disposition towards religious minorities in Georgia is in-
consistent. A large section of the population perceived the instituted changes 
as dangerous since several religious unions in Georgia would be proclaimed as 
legal entities of public law. Public disposition was the Patriarch’s commentary, 
suggesting that the legislation was alarming and dangerous since it could be 
abused in the future76. The Patriarch urged the president and the government 
to bring the decision to a standstill, and organize discussions about the issue 
with scientists, clergy and experts77. Year 2011 witnessed another interesting 
event when Saakashvili’s government attempted to complete an agreement 
with Turkey, which would ensure the rehabilitation of Georgian churches 
located on the territory of Turkey. The agreement was ready to be signed in 
2007, but the government halted the process due to negative outcry from the 
Church78. The treaty also entailed reconstruction of Azizei mosque in Batu-
mi burnt down in 1930’s, a plan which was criticized by the Patriarchate79. 
Archpriest Davit Sharashenidze argued that according to international law, 
protection of the world’s cultural and natural heritage was the obligation of 
Turkish state80. The Patriarchate also expressed its disapprobation for being 
excluded from the dialogue81. The treaty still has not been signed82.
The majority of interviewed politicians feel that constitutional changes 
in regard to religious minorities were rushed and that the issue requires more 
discussion and consultations with the Patriarchate83. This standpoint echoes 
the Patriarch’s statement mentioned above, suggesting that politicians take 
the Patriarch’s opinion into account when considering matters of public rel-
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evance. When discussing politics and public relations, it is interesting to look 
at the 2012 parliamentary elections since some experts believe that this is 
when the public witnessed active advocacy of certain political parties by the 
clergy84. Before the parliamentary elections of 2012 there were rumors that 
some clergy urged their parish to vote for the Georgian Dream. As one re-
searcher noted in a private conversation, “our priest incited us to vote for the 
Georgian Dream… Naturally, I voted for them” 85. 
Conclusion
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union Georgian society was given 
a chance to successfully transition to democracy and build a contemporary 
European nation-state. Simultaneously, as a result of the Soviet Union’s fall, 
the country witnessed religious ascendancy since Soviet anti-religious poli-
cies were no longer reinforced, and every religious organization in post-Soviet 
bloc acquired absolute freedom of action86. The Georgian Orthodox Church 
rapidly turned from a subordinate institution to a spiritual and cultural lead-
er of the nation87. 
Interviews with politicians conducted in the framework of this research 
have demonstrated that on the one hand, the majority of political elite rec-
ognizes democratic principles and believes that Georgia needs to develop in 
a democratic manner, which implies respect for diverse opinions, protection 
of minority rights and acknowledgement of religious pluralism. On the oth-
er hand, many politicians endorse increased status of Orthodox Christianity, 
while the majority considers that the Orthodox Church is not sufficiently 
protected88.
Since the 90’s the Georgian Orthodox Church was the only organiza-
tion that to some extent unified the nation. Today, the Church is an insti-
tute most trusted by Georgian society89. As this research has demonstrated, 
the Church has an enduring influence on public opinion, which was revealed 
both in consequence to the failed agreement with the Vatican during She-
vardnadze’s leadership, and Saakashvili’s government, when Georgian pub-
lic took to the streets in order to protect the Church’s stance regarding the 
mosque renovation or constitutional changes for religious unions. The gov-
ernment elected in 2012 largely consists of the political powers discussed in 
this article. Therefore, it is interesting whether new political elite and Geor-
gian civil society will be able to contribute to the establishment of European 
democracy in the country, which among other issues implies strict separation 
of state and church. 
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